Patenting Dr. Venter\u27s Genetic Findings: Is the National Institutes of Health Creating Hurdles or Clearing the Path for Biotechnology\u27s Voyage into the Twenty-First Century ? by Riley, Paul J.
Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) 
Volume 10 Issue 1 Article 23 
1994 
Patenting Dr. Venter's Genetic Findings: Is the National Institutes 
of Health Creating Hurdles or Clearing the Path for 
Biotechnology's Voyage into the Twenty-First Century ? 
Paul J. Riley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp 
Recommended Citation 
Paul J. Riley, Patenting Dr. Venter's Genetic Findings: Is the National Institutes of Health Creating Hurdles 
or Clearing the Path for Biotechnology's Voyage into the Twenty-First Century ?, 10 J. Contemp. Health L. 
& Pol'y 309 (1994). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp/vol10/iss1/23 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) by an authorized editor of CUA 
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
COMMENTS
PATENTING DR. VENTER'S GENETIC
FINDINGS: IS THE NATIONAL
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH
CREATING HURDLES OR
CLEARING THE PATH FOR
BIOTECHNOLOGY'S VOYAGE INTO THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?
We have a 200-year-old patent system established by Thomas
Jefferson for the express purpose of making sure that "both in-
dividuals and society reap the benefits of human industry and
creativity." Surely, Thomas Jefferson could never have pre-
dicted what a quandary his highly successful patent system
would face over Mother Nature's secrets.'
Since the issuance of the first United States patent to Samuel Hopkins
in 1790,2 patent law has evolved under the guidance of federal legislation
and decisions handed down by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
and the federal courts. The growth of patent law has not been un-
problematic, however, due in large part to the inability and sometimes
unwillingness of the courts and Congress to keep up with scientific pro-
gress.3 This has especially been the case in the latter half of the twentieth
century in the field of biomedical science.4 Giant strides in biotechnology
1. Robin Herman, The Great Gene Gold Rush: U.S. Rankles Other Countries with
Preemptive Strike in the Race to Patent Human Genes, WASH. POST, June 16, 1992,
(Health), at 11, 16 (quoting Bernadine Healy, M.D., former Director, National Institutes of
Health, Public Health Service, Dept. of Health and Human Services).
2. Alex Barnum, Biotech Labs Enraged by Bid to Patent Human Genes, S.F. CHRON.,
Dec. 2, 1991, at B1. The patent was granted for making potash, which is used to produce
fertilizer, soap and other products. Id.
3. On Gene Patenting: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and
Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter On Gene Patenting] (testimony of Bernadine Healy, M.D., Director, National Institutes
of Health).
4. See Jessica Mathews, The Race to Claim the Gene, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1991, at
C7 (suggesting that the decision to patent the gene sequences should be made by elected
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have left society behind to deal with the consequences.'
Current biotechnology, as well as its attendant patent disputes, had its
auspicious beginnings in 1973 with the invention of genetic engineering.'
This new technology enabled scientists to recombine human genes and
create "tiny factories" from cells.7 As discoveries in molecular genetics
and recombinant DNA technology proliferated, many policy debates en-
sued regarding how to protect the inventor's interests while transferring
the discovery to the public in a way that they could benefit.8 In 1980, the
Supreme Court addressed this dispute in the landmark case Diamond v.
Chakrabarty. The Court concluded that genetically engineered microor-
ganisms are patentable.9 Since the Chakrabarty decision, "it has been a
fast slide down a legal slippery slope."'1 Patent law, by recognizing that
plants, animals, genes, cDNA's, hybridomas and monoclonal antibodies
are patentable, did its best to keep up with the rapid growth of the bio-
technology industry it had encouraged."
The courts and the PTO were not alone in encouraging the creation of
officials, rather than by patent lawyers, in order to circumvent the pitfalls that accompany
unregulated scientific advancements).
5. See id. This has particularly been the case in the areas of molecular genetics and
recombinant DNA technology, where scientists and policymakers have received no gui-
dance regarding how to "best transfer this powerful information into practical public bene-
fit." On Gene Patenting, supra note 3, at 5.
6. Biotechnology Development and Patent Law: Oversight Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1991) [hereinafter Biotechnology Development and Pat-
ent Law] (statement of Bernadine Healy, M.D., Director, National Institutes of Health).
Genetic engineering, which involves splicing genes from one organism into another, was
invented by Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer in 1973. They received a patent on this
technique in 1980, following the Chakrabarty decision. See Barnum, supra note 2, at B1.
7. Biotechnology Development and Patent Law, supra note 6, at 5.
8. See On Gene Patenting, supra note 3, at 5.
9. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme
Court held that genetically engineered microorganisms (in this case genetically engineered,
oil-eating microbes) merit patent protection. Id.
10. Mathews, supra note 4, at C7.
11. Reid G. Adler, Technology Transfer and Genome-Related Research 9 (Oct. 22,
1991) (transcript available in the NIH Press Office). Reid Adler is the Director of the
Office of Technology Transfer at the National Institutes of Health. He has spearheaded
the NIH initiative on acquiring patents on the cDNA fragments. The examples noted by
Adler fall into the category of products of nature that have been fashioned by humans in
some manner. While the line between that which is created in the laboratory and that
which is discovered in the "wild" is often difficult to discern, courts are likely to grant
patent protection to discoveries that through human intervention take a form that does not
naturally occur. Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 161-62 (4th
Cir. 1958).
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the billion dollar, American biotech industry. Recognizing the rise of
biotechnology, Congress passed two acts 2 in 1980 to foster the "transfer
of Government laboratory-developed technology to commercial applica-
tions."' 3 Six years later, Congress passed the Federal Technology Trans-
fer Act to further stimulate cooperation between industry and
government laboratories.' 4
The United States was not the only country to realize the benefits asso-
ciated with advancements in biotechnology. In response to suggestions
that the discovery of human genes would likely uncover the mysteries
behind certain diseases,' 5 the Human Genome Organization, an interna-
tional collaborative effort, was established in 1988.16 The United States'
national program, the U.S. Human Genome Project,' 7 was formed to
work with other countries to locate and define the sequences of all
human genes in order to create "a framework for molecular medical re-
search directed towards understanding the genetic bases of human health
and disease and basic life functions, including development."'18
As a direct result of this international collaboration, Dr. Craig Venter,
a research scientist leading a fifteen person laboratory within the Na-
tional Institutes of Health's (NIH) National Institute of Neurological Dis-
orders and Stroke,' 9 utilized newly developed instrumentation, powerful
computers, and advanced robotics to perform gene sequencing at a rapid
pace.2" In 1991, NIH decided to seek a patent on the Venter team's find-
ings. 1 The filing of this patent application took the biotechnology indus-
12. Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (1980); Stevenson-Wydler Technology Inno-
vation Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. § 3710(a) (1980).
13. Biotechnology Development and Patent Law, supra note 6, at 7.
14. Federal Technology Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3701 (1986). The Federal Technology
Transfer Act (FTA) creates incentives for companies and federal laboratories to enter
into Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs), which "allow[s]
each participant to direct personnel, services, and property funds toward collaborative
joint research projects." Biotechnology Development and Patent Law, supra note 6, at 7.
15. Hilary Stout, U.S. Pursuit of Gene Patents Riles Industry, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13,
1992, at B1.
16. The Human Genome Organization is an international collaborative effort that lo-
cates and defines the chemical sequences of all of the 100,000 human genes. Herman, supra
note 1, at 16.
17. The United States Human Genome Project is jointly financed by NIH and the
Department of Energy. Id.
18. On Gene Patenting, supra note 3, at 2.
19. Feds Trying to Corner Gene Market, Critics Say, NEWSDAY, Nov. 1, 1991, at 55.
20. Gina Kolata, Biologist's Speedy Gene Method Scares Peers But Gains Backer, N.Y.
TiMES, July 28, 1992, at CIO.
21. On Gene Patenting, supra note 3, at 8-11.
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try by surprise and launched a heated debate among all parties
involved.22
This Comment evaluates the problems and issues that have arisen as a
result of NIH's filing of the patent application. This Comment first out-
lines the circumstances that prompted NIH to file the application.23 This
Comment then focuses on the patentability of human gene sequences,
including the PTO's initial rejection of the application and NIH's
counterarguments. 24 This Comment concludes with a policy discussion of
the arguments presented by NIH, the biotech industry, scientists, and for-
eign countries.25
I. THE ERUPTION OF THE CONTROVERSY
Scientific discoveries have the ability to take the world by storm and
transform society. The ultimate effects of scientific advancements are dif-
ficult to predict at the outset, thus creating an air of apprehension.26 The
human gene mapping initiative has caused great apprehension in the bio-
technology community.
27
Scientific understanding of the human genetic makeup dates back to
1953, when Drs. James Watson and Francis Crick propounded the double
helical structure of DNA in chromosomes. 2 8 Thereafter, scientists, un-
derstanding that research into gene sequences may provide both cures
and preventative treatments for diseases, have struggled to determine
which genetic instructions are coded by which particular nucleotide se-
quences.2 9 Mapping genes is a "tedious and daunting endeavor," requir-
ing great amounts of time and money.3"
22. Barnum, supra note 2, at B1.
23. See infra notes 26-48 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 49-99 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 100-146 and accompanying text.
26. On Gene Patenting, supra note 3, at 2.
27. Double Helix Battles, WASH. POST, May 1, 1992, at A26 (discussing the dispute
between Dr. James Watson, former head of the U.S. Human Genome Project, and NIH).
Dr. Watson quit his position with the Human Genome Project because he believed that
patenting unidentified gene sequences was "sheer lunacy" and would ruin international
cooperation in the genetics field. Herman, supra note 1, at 11.
28. Herman, supra note 1, at 12. This is the same Dr. Watson who headed the U.S.
Human Genome Project. Id. at 11.
29. Lynne Langley, Genetics Holds Hope, Pitfalls, POST & COURIER, Mar. 24, 1992, at
B1.
30. Herman, supra note 1, at 12. Determining where one gene ends and the other
begins is difficult, especially given that genes range in length from two thousand to two
million nucleotide pairs. Id.
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When scientists identify a gene sequence and determine its role, this
valuable knowledge can bring enormous wealth to the licensed company
or companies. 31 The biotech company Amgen is an excellent example of
a company that has realized the monetary value of genetic knowledge.
After being awarded a patent for a gene sequence it identified that "in-
structs kidney cells to make an important blood protein missing in people
with renal failure and on dialysis," Amgen reaped $400 million in annual
sales from a welcome market.32 With such high financial returns as an
incentive, researchers worldwide33 are focusing their efforts on "cracking
the genetic safe." The strong international interest in this area was evi-
denced by the commitment of three billion dollars to the fifteen year
Human Genome Project to "decipher every gene in the blueprint for
human life," with the long-term goal of understanding enigmatic
diseases.34
At the Project's inception, U.S. scientists maintained that the entirety
of the human gene sequences would be defined; however, their concen-
tration today is on cDNAs.35 Dr. Venter and his team of NIH scientists
developed a process that quickly sequences genes using cDNA.36 The
procedure requires pulling a cDNA out of the human brain cDNA li-
brary,37 amplifying the cDNA, and sequencing a portion of it.38 The par-
tial sequence, called an Expressed Sequence Tag (EST), is decoded into
its constituent nucleotides, which enables the scientist to determine
whether the EST represents a new gene.39 This shortcut method' saves
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 11.
34. C. Ezzell, Speeding the Search for New Human Genes, SCIENCE NEWS, June 22,
1991, at 389.
35. Leslie Roberts, Gambling on a Shortcut to Genome Sequencing, 252 SCIENCE 1618
(1991). DNA is a large molecule in the shape of a double helix, which carries the genetic
information necessary for the replication of cells and for the production of proteins. Her-
man, supra note 1, at 12. Complementary DNA (cDNA) is a synthetic chemical analog of
DNA from which the non-coding DNA sequences called introns, or "junk DNA," have
been removed. Id.
36. On Gene Patenting, supra note 3, at 4.
37. Robert Benson, Address to the Biotechnology Committee of the American Intel-
lectual Property Law Association 3 (May 14, 1992) (transcript available in the NIH Press
Office) (discussing the research project performed by Dr. Venter and his group and ad-
dressing patentability concerns).
38. Id. The sequenced portion ranges from approximately 150 to 500 nucleotides. Id.
39. Id. "This information is obtained by comparing the nucleotide sequence of the
EST or its complement, or the 6 [six] amino acid sequences of the six possible encoded
polypeptides, with those contained in databases like GenBank or Protein Information Re-
source." Id.
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time and money because it allows the researcher to rapidly understand
which genes are active in specific tissues without having to sort through
"junk" DNA.41 Dr. Venter predicts that his technique will enable com-
pletion of the Human Genome Project by 1997, far ahead of the original
schedule predicting completion early in the twenty-first century.42
Following the development of Dr. Venter's process, the patent contro-
versy arose. Knowledge of partial gene sequences does not tell the re-
searcher the biological function or purpose of a gene in a particular
tissue.43 Dr. Venter candidly admits that he does not know what most of
his "tagged" DNA does,44 and that attaining such information will re-
quire additional extensive research and analysis. Nevertheless, NIH
feared that the publication of Dr. Venter's findings would be a "tragic
mistake" that could seriously undermine the U.S. biotech effort,45 and
decided to seek patent rights on approximately 2,400 of the DNA frag-
ments (ESTs) without knowledge of their biological function.46 NIH's
action "set off an international scientific furor,"'47 involving the entire bi-
otech industry. "The very notion of patenting human genes, the essence
of human life, is offensive to some lawyers and scientists. And the idea
that someone might be able to use these fragments as a shortcut to claim
ownership of genes is sending some experts into near apoplexy.",
48
II. THE PATENTABILITY DEBATE
Patents are defined as, "intensely practical, real-life legal instruments,"
which serve as a vehicle to protect the scientist's investment in time, re-
sources and money.49 The United States Constitution grants Congress
the power to enact laws that "promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclu-
40. Fishing for Complements, ECONOMIST, Jan. 18. 1992, at 85 (discussing Dr. Venter's
work and NIH's chances of acquiring the cDNA patents).
41. Id.
42. Tim Friend, Gene-Hunting Picks Up Steam, USA TODAY, Feb. 13, 1992, at Al.
43. On Gene Patenting, supra note 3, at 4-5.
44. Leslie Roberts, Genome Patent Fight Erupts, 254 SCIENCE 184 (1991).
45. Id. at 185.
46. Roberta Friedman, 2-5 Years to Sequence Brain Genes, BIOWORLD TODAY, Feb.
14, 1992, at 3.
47. Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Seeks Patent on Genetic Codes, Setting Off Furor, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 1991, at Al.
48. Gina Kolata, Ideas and Trends: In Rush to Patent Genes, The Claims Get Smaller,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1992, § 4, at 12.
49. Irving Kayton, PATENT PRACTICE, Vol. 1, 1-1 (4th ed. 1989).
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sive Right to their Writings and Discoveries." 0 The current American
patent system encourages industry to take the risks needed to develop
products, enhances public disclosure and limits secrecy, educates the pub-
lic so that improvements and alternatives can be explored, and fosters
invention.5 ' A patent is a contract between its owner and the U.S. Gov-
ernment, whereby the owner is given security in exchange for sharing
knowledge with the public.52 The system is designed to enhance research
by guaranteeing inventors seventeen years of protection from "pirates"
who would be unjustly enriched in the absence of such restrictions.
53
Patent protection has proven very valuable in the field of biotechnol-
ogy, in which more than $100 million and ten years of research and test-
ing are routinely invested to develop a single drug.54 Biotechnology
industry analysts observe that patent protection is a major consideration
in a company's decision to pursue a new drug.5 5 Absent protection, the
risks of being beaten to the cure outweigh the possibility of a financial
windfall.
Understanding biotechnology's competitive climate, NIH decided in
June 1991 to pursue patents on the DNA fragments discovered by Dr.
Venter.5 6 A continuation-in-part of this application was filed in February
1992.5' The most significant basis for the decision to seek patent protec-
tion was NIH's fear that the publication of Dr. Venter's data would make
the future patenting of his findings impossible, because his gene frag-
ments would become part of the public domain.58 Because keeping Dr.
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Today, "technological arts" is considered the
equivalent of "useful arts." Reid G. Adler, Biotechnology as an Intellectual Property, 224
SCIENCE 357, 363 n.12 (1984).
51. Adler, supra note 11, at 5 n.6.
52. Id. at 5-6.
53. Barnum, supra note 2, at B9.
54. Id.
55. On Gene Patenting, supra note 3, at 8. A study by the Mansfield group found that
"60% of pharmaceutical products would not have been developed without patent protec-
tion." Id.
56. Mary Knudson, NIH Criticized for Seeking Patents on Hundreds of Partial Genes,
BALT. SUN, Nov. 3, 1991, at 40.
57. Malcolm Gladwell, NIH Files Patent Applications on 2,300 More Human Genes,
PHILA. INO., Feb. 16, 1992, at A3. The application referred to as a continuation-in-part was
filed in February. It was added to a much smaller patent filing made by NIH in the sum-
mer of 1991. Taken together, these claims constitute a claim by NIH to rights to over five
percent of the genes found in the human body. Id.
58. Kolata, supra note 20, at C1. A patent is barred for lack of novelty if there is
enough in the prior art to enable someone skilled in the area to perform the process or
produce the product described in the patent application. Therefore, if Dr. Venter pub-
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Venter's findings secret until further research could be performed was not
an option,59 NIH filed the patent application at the PTO.
In August 1992, the PTO rejected NIH's patent application for the
gene fragments of unknown function. The patent examiner concluded
that NIH failed to satisfy the PTO's four tests for patentability: novelty,
non-obviousness, enablement and utility.'
A. Novelty
Novelty was the first ground for the PTO's rejection of the applica-
tion.61 To satisfy the novelty requirement, the gene fragments must not
have been previously known.62 The PTO concluded that because the
claimed sequences were derived from already existing cDNA libraries,
they were already in the public domain.63
Rejection on the basis of novelty should be reversed on appeal. Deny-
ing novelty because the sequences were taken from a publicly available
clone collection seems irrational when evaluated on a larger scale.' If
this policy were followed "virtually all products isolated from expected
sources of biomolecules, such as blood, saliva, or tissue" would be unpat-
entable.61 Biotechnology as we know it would cease to exist because any
gene traced to a genetic library would be nonpatentable, thus destroying
any incentives to industry and scientists.66 This is not the policy of the
PTO,67 and if NIH's cDNA patent claims are rewritten and clarified, the
lishes his findings before pursuing patent rights, there is a distinct possibility that protec-
tion will be denied on this basis. Id.
59. On Gene Patenting, supra note 3, at 10.
60. Leslie Roberts, Rumors Fly Over Rejection of NIH Claim, 257 SCIENCE 1855
(1992). See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03, 112 (1988) (codifying the four requirements for
patentability).
61. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988) reads: "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless -
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a
printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the appli-
cant for a patent ......
62. Pamela Zurer, Critics Take Aim at NIH's Gene Patenting Strategy, C & EN, June 8,
1992, at 21.
63. Patent Office Has Initially Declined NIH's cDNA Patent Application, LIFE SCIENCE
(Washington Fax: An Information Service, Wash., D.C.), Sept. 25, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter
Patent Application Initially Declined].
64. Roberts, supra note 60, at 1855. Patent protection is sought for the sequences
derived from these libraries. Id.
65. Patent Application Initially Declined, supra note 63, at 1.
66. See id. at 1-2.
67. Applied properly, patent law enhances the incentive to develop new technology.
An effective patent system ensures the orderly protection of technological innovation to
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examiner's novelty rejection is likely to be withdrawn.
B. Non-Obviousness
Non-obviousness is the second ground for the PTO's rejection of the
NIH application. Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, a patent is denied when the
subject matter of the invention would be obvious to one working in the
field at the time of the invention.6" This section prevents the issuance of
a patent when the new art and the prior art are so closely related that the
inventor's contribution to prior art does not merit protection.69 The PTO
reasoned that because some of the sequences presented in the application
were derived from smaller fragments that had already been published,
creating a larger sequence or an entire gene using this prior art would be
obvious to any scientist." This reasoning is consistent with the views of
Dr. James Watson, an outspoken critic of NIH's patenting initiative, who
believes that "virtually any monkey" can perform the work of Dr. Ven-
ter's laboratory.7'
This rejection is not without merit. Dr. Venter neither invented the
concept of sequencing cDNA, nor created the technology to perform the
process. 72 However, the PTO may have been somewhat hasty in arriving
at its conclusion of obviousness. If the PTO allows this ruling to stand, no
patent can be issued on a gene if any of its sequences have already been
published, regardless of how much time and money was spent to deter-
mine the full makeup of the gene and its function in the cell.73 Such a
policy would destroy incentives for biotech companies to pursue projects
allow creative individuals to expend their time, money and energy in the process of in-
venting. Kayton, supra note 49.
68. Section 103 reads:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to
a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
69. Adler, supra note 50, at 359.
70. Christopher Anderson, NIH cDNA Patent Rejected; Backers Want to Amend Law,
359 NATURE 263 (1992).
71. Roberts, supra note 44, at 184.
72. Christopher Anderson, To Patent a Naked Gene, 353 NATURE 485 (1991). Scien-
tists before Dr. Venter were aware of this sequencing method, but it was dismissed as
impractical on the belief that some genes have so few mRNA copies that they would es-
cape detection. Kolata, supra note 20, at CIO.
73. Anderson, supra note 70, at 263.
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which have the goal of determining the base products on those genes.74
Finally, while Dr. Venter's research can fairly be characterized as less
than incredible, it is hardly "monkey's work." His team successfully de-
duced that the human genome could rapidly be mapped by combining
large-scale cDNA sequencing with the searching ability of electronic
DNA databases.75 Their foresight should be given strong consideration,
as U.S. patent law explicitly states that it is irrelevant how an invention is
made or how little energy is expended.76
If the PTO remains steadfast on its views regarding obviousness, Con-
gress should pass legislation to expressly allow a patent to be issued on a
full gene, even if a partial gene has already been published.77 Without
such protection, the dissemination of scientific findings, which is a major
purpose of our patent system, will come to a screeching halt.
78
C. Utility
Utility is the third ground for the PTO's rejection of the NIH patent
application.79 The PTO concluded that Dr. Venter's discoveries failed to
identify the genes of which the sequences were a part, the proteins coded
by these sequences, and the function of these partially sequenced genes.'
More research was necessary in order to determine the utility of these
nucleotide sequences."1 This rejection is supported by Brenner v. Man-
son, where the Supreme Court concluded that an invention must have a
practical use beyond merely being a tool for scientific inquiry.82
74. Id.
75. Anderson, supra note 72, at 485.
76. Reid Adler states: "Patent law specifically says that you can't consider how the
invention was made. It's irrelevant if a trained chimpanzee can do the work. The law
doesn't want some judge deciding if someone sweated enough to deserve a patent." Id.
77. Patent Application Initially Declined, supra note 63, at 2.
78. Reid Adler and Dr. Craig Venter insist that biotech companies "will be leery of
touching these inventions without adequate patent and license protection from NIH," and
therefore, delay will burden the scientific discovery process. Roberts, supra note 44, at
185.
79. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of
this title.").
80. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Genes, Patents, and Product Development, 257 SCIENCE 903,
904-05 (1992).
81. Leslie Roberts, Top HHS Lawyer Seeks to Block NIH, 258 SCIENCE 209, 210
(1992).
82. 383 U.S. 519 (1966). One commentator argues that this opinion suggests that the
utility requirement distinguishes between basic research, which should not be patented,
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While NIH does not know the exact, future utility of the cDNA se-
quences, the PTO's rejection on the basis of utility may be premature and
unduly restrictive: "Patents have been awarded for discovery of novel
biological molecules for which the full range of function-or even most
important function-is not known." 3 Although the biological function
associated with the cDNAs is not presently known, other practical uses,
such as chromosome markers, vehicles to differentiate brain tissue from
other human tissue, and primers for polymerase chain reactions, are
known. 4 Such possible uses certainly satisfy the PTO's utility require-
ment, especially in light of the fact that chromosome markers are pres-
ently sold throughout industry without any reliance on the gene's
biological function. 5 Furthermore, U.S. patent law does not require that
all uses be determined; it only requires some threshold activity. 6 Finally,
the PTO's rejection on the basis of utility appears to directly conflict with
several recent lower court decisions that favor granting intellectual prop-
erty rights to avoid trade secrets and secrecy in the biotechnology indus-
try.87 NIH is attempting to-patent more than mere research; Dr. Venter's
findings are advanced technology with the potential to stimulate advance-
ments in the biotech arena. Requiring an uncharacteristically high
threshold for utility will frustrate the dissemination of critical technology
into the public domain.
D. Enablement
The final basis for the PTO's rejection of the NIH patent application is
the enablement provision in the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.88 The
and applied technology, which may be patented, thereby "confining the operation of the
patent system 'to the world of commerce rather than to the realm of philosophy."' Eisen-
berg, supra note 80, at 905.
83. Healy Outlines Likely Patent Debate Issues, LIF SCIENCE (Washington Fax: An
Information Service, Wash., D.C.), June 2, 1992, at 1 (quoting Bernadine Healy, M.D.,
former Director, National Institutes of Health).
84. Benson, supra note 37, at 6-7.
85. Patent Application Initially Declined, supra note 63, at 1.
86. Roberts, supra note 44, at 185. Adler stated: "[Y]ou don't have to know all the
uses for an invention but just some sort of threshold activity." Id.
87. Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 905.
88. Section 112 reads:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
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provision requires the applicant to provide an adequate written descrip-
tion of the claimed invention and an enabling disclosure. 9 This enable-
ment provision serves many present and future purposes.' The PTO
concluded that the NIH patent application did not provide an adequate
definition of Dr. Venter's findings and did not offer enough information
to enable an individual skilled in the area to make and use the
invention.9'
Once again, the PTO may have been overly critical of NIH's applica-
tion. The application discusses in great detail numerous examples of how
an individual knowledgeable in biotechnology can isolate the cDNA and,
if given the sequence, the genomic version of the gene.92 The 300 to 500
base fragments sequenced by Dr. Venter encode information that is
"more specific than fingerprints at identifying [a personl," 93 and there-
fore should constitute information sufficient to evince entire genes.94
While NIH's claims are very broad and general, they are adequate when
viewed in light of the advanced level of knowledge present in this field.95
Although the PTO initially declined the NIH's cDNA application, the
fight is hardly over. 6 NIH was not surprised by the decision, especially
since the PTO rejects ninety percent of all first-time applications. 97 NIH
may respond to the PTO's rejection at the beginning of 1994.98 The PTO
may reevaluate the application, and if it is rejected again, NIH may ap-
peal the decision in federal court.9 9 Policy promises to be a major consid-
eration if the dispute reaches the courts.
89. Roberts, supra note 81, at 210.
90. "Enablement makes the patent understandable by those in its field to avoid in-
fringement; provides the public with the ability to practice the invention after the patent
expires; and secures the continuous disclosure of novel, useful, and unobvious technical
advances." Adler, supra note 50, at 360.
91. Roberts, supra note 81, at 210.
92. Benson, supra note 37, at 7.
93. Leslie Roberts, NIH Gene Patents, Round Two, 255 SCIENCE, 912, 913 (1992)
(quoting Dr. Craig Venter).
94. Roberts, supra note 81, at 210.
95. Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 905.
96. Patent Application Initially Declined, supra note 63, at 2.
97. Roberts, supra note 60, at 1855. The issues of novelty, utility and nonobviousness
have proven to be stringent standards that are rarely satisfied in a first-time application.
See Patent Application Initially Declined, supra note 63, at 1.
98. Roberts, supra note 60, at 1855.
99. Irving Kayton, PATENT PRACTICE, Vol. 4, 18-15 (4th ed. 1989).
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III. POLICY ISSUES SURROUNDING THE NIH DNA APPLICATION
Although NIH's application is currently being circulated through the
PTO and various NIH offices, some experts believe the dispute will ulti-
mately wind up in federal court." ° The debate centers not so much on
the legal question of whether the cDNAs may be patented, but rather on
the societal concerns of the biotech community as to whether the patent
should be granted.' °' Patent law cannot remain static. The courts and
Congress must function as responsive entities that balance the harms and
benefits of patenting technological advances and adroitly create policy to
reduce risks while enhancing advancements.
NIH directors are frequently asked why patent protection was sought
at such an early stage, especially when waiting for further research would
make their patent application more readily acceptable. °2 NIH quickly
responds that it did not intend to seek patents at the inception of the
Human Genome Project, °3 but that many circumstances, including the
celerity of the sequencing, have left it with no other responsible choice
except to exercise all available options.'0 Congressional legislation and
other federal mandates delegate to NIH the duty to secure inventions
emanating from federally-funded laboratories.' 05 Licensing intellectual
property rights is the primary means to protect taxpayers research invest-
ments and scientific ingenuity, and to deliver these discoveries to the pub-
lic."° NIH's policy is to ensure that new therapies and pharmaceuticals
100. Roberts, supra note 81, at 210. Henry Wixum, a patent attorney with the Washing-
ton, D.C. law firm of Hale & Dorr, stated, "I would not be surprised if the board thinks it is
too hot and kicks it upstairs to the next level, to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit." Id.
101. Roberts, supra note 44, at 185. Much of the argument is cast in terms of the possi-
ble effects on industry and international collaboration. Id. at 185-86.
102. See generally Adler, supra note 11, at 11-14; Healy Explains NIH Position on Pat-
enting cDNA, LIFE SCIENCE (Washington Fax: An Information Service, Wash., D.C.), June
1, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter NIH Position]; The Affect of Patent Law on Molecular Biology,
Genetics and the Human Genome Is Not Clear, Says Healy, LIFE SCIENCE (Washington Fax:
An Information Service, Wash., D.C.), Nov. 20, 1991, at 1 [hereinafter Affect of Patent
Law].
103. Telephone Interview with Dr. Craig Venter, former NIH Researcher (Mar. 18,
1992) [hereinafter Telephone Interview].
104. See Memorandum from Bernadine Healy, Director, NIH, to Colleagues (July
1992) (draft on file in the NIH Press Office) [hereinafter Memorandum].
105. See, e.g., Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701 et seq.
(1986); Exec. Order No. 12,592, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,417 (1987). See also Affect of Patent Law,
supra note 102, at 1.
106. See NIH Position, supra note 102, at 1-2.
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reach the public as quickly as possible.1"7
Given the surrounding circumstances, NIH's decision to seek patent
protection was logical. If Dr. Venter's research had been published
before a patent application was filed, the United States government
would have forfeited all international patent rights in the sequences,'08
and possibly all rights in any discoveries resulting from the sequences. 1' 9
Because U.S. patent law is constantly changing," 0 NIH felt that "it [is]
worth filing the application, if for no other reason than not to miss the
boat,""' and possibly lose a valuable technological opportunity.
112
NIH, under the direction of Dr. Bernadine Healy, had been aggressive
in seeking patents, not as "fundraising tool[s]" 113 but as vehicles to en-
courage development and stimulate the commercialization of government
funded discoveries by private industry." 4 However, NIH policy also re-
quires that advancement be carried out in a socially responsible way." 5
Therefore, the concerns of industry and the international scientific com-
munity should be evaluated to determine if NIH's policy is acceptable.
A. International Concerns
Controversy erupted among Human Genome Project scientists in Eu-
rope and Japan after NIH filed its patent application for Dr. Venter's
cDNA fragments." 6 NIH's action was viewed as "seriously prejudicial to
the whole thrust of the international Human Genome Project,"'1 7 and
107. Memorandum, supra note 104, at 1-2.
108. Elizabeth Sullivan, Pandora's Box Opens, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Mar.
1, 1992, at C1.
109. Adler, supra note 11, at 12. Forfeiture of patent rights occurred when the U.S.
scientists published their genetic engineering discovery. Today, American scientists have
to pay licensing fees.on basic gene splicing techniques, while overseas scientists are not
charged. Sullivan, supra note 108, at 1-C.
110. See Adler, supra note 50, at 357-63.
111. Anderson, supra note 72, at 485 (quoting Reid Adler). Adler stated: "This is not
the strongest case for utility I've ever seen, but it's not the weakest either." Id.
112. Memorandum, supra note 104, at 2.
113. Larry Thompson, NIH's Rush to Patent Human Genes, WASH. PosT, Oct. 28, 1991,
at A3 (quoting Reid Adler).
114. Edmund L. Andrews, Dr. Healy's Big Push on Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1992,
at F12.
115. Memorandum, supra note 104, at 2.
116. David Swinbanks, Japanese Researchers Rule Out Gene Patents, 356 NATURE 181
(1992). Scientists worldwide are debating the advantages and disadvantages of issuing such
patents and are expressing concern over the future of the Human Genome Project. Rob-
erts, supra note 44, at 184.
117. Peter Aldhous, Tit for Tat on Patents, 353 NATURE 785 (1991).
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fears that international collaboration on genetic mapping and sequencing
would deteriorate into unhealthy competition were expressed.' 18 Euro-
pean scientists and government officials characterized the patent initia-
tive as "a Wild West-style land grab over common human territory,"" 9
and suggested that the patenting effort would promote secrecy, create an
international race to patent genes, and stifle discoveries.120 Each country
responded differently. In March 1992, Britain's Medical Research Coun-
cil (MRC) filed an application with the British Patent Office to patent its
gene fragments.' 21 Although the MRC characterized its action as a de-
fensive measure to protect itself should NIH's application be granted,
122
the MRC already kept sequences secret and was preparing to sell them to
industry. 23 Japan, also a vocal critic of the NIH initiative, jumped into
the "gene-patent fray" in February 1993, when the Sagami Chemical Re-
search Center (a private foundation in Kanagawa Prefecture) filed appli-
cations for sixty gene sequences with the Japanese Patent Office.' 24
Other countries with large biotech industries, such as France, did not fol-
low suit,' 25 but they did express fear that the industry would crumble if
they were forced to pay licensing fees for the gene sequences.
26
At the First South-North International Human Genome Conference in
May 1992, international disapproval of NIH's patent initiative was ex-
pressed in a declaration, which called for NIH to abandon patenting natu-
118. Rachel Nowak, Gene Researchers Challenge the Patent Frontier, JOURNAL OF NIH
RESEARCH, Dec. 1991, at 25-26.
119. Richard L. Hudson, British Move to Patent Gene Fragments Escalates a Battle With
Washington, WALL ST. J., July 16, 1992, at B2. Opinions condemning U.S. efforts to ac-
quire these intellectual property rights have been voiced by the British Medical Research
Council. Id.
120. Catherine Arnst, European Scientists Fight U.S. Effort to Patent Genetic Parts, ST.
Louis COUNTIAN, Feb. 25, 1992, at 1, 9.
121. Hudson, supra note 119, at B2.
122. Christopher Anderson & Peter Aldhous, Secrecy and the Bottom Line, 354 NA-
TURE 96 (1991).
123. The U.K.'s desire to sell their data was characterized as "a stye in the eye of inter-
national progress on the genome." Id. (quoting Charles Cantor, Chief Scientist for the
U.S. Department of Energy's Human Genome Project).
124. Aya Furuta, Japan Jumps Into Gene-Patent Fray, NIKKEI WEEKLY, Mar. 1, 1993, at
13. There is no precedent for granting a patent on genes without a known specific applica-
tion in the Japanese Patent Office. However, the applications submitted by Sagami are for
genes that have been completely sequenced, which suggests that the functions and struc-
tures of the encoded proteins can be inferred. Id.
125. Declan Butler, Who Owns the Building Blocks of Life?, INDEPENDENT, Nov. 2,
1992, at 14.
126. Nowak, supra note 118, at 26.
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rally occurring DNA sequences. 127 Five months later, Charles Auffray, a
leading French human genome researcher, released France's genome
data to the scientific community as a "symbolic protest" against countries
seeking patents on the gene sequences.12s In conjunction with this pro-
test, 200 genome scientists worldwide demonstrated their support for a
policy of free accessibility by signing a declaration to UNESCO calling
for all results of the genome project to "remain part of man's scientific
heritage."' 2 9 This patent dispute, however, embodies more than de-
manded good will; it also involves monetary considerations, which, if ig-
nored, could cost the nonastute country huge profits and possibly result
in the collapse of the country's biotech industry.
Despite these international concerns, NIH should not be faulted for
moving ahead with its patent applications. All of the countries involved
in the Human Genome Project view the role of Human Genome Organi-
zation and their respective obligations to the Project differently. 130 No
guidelines or international agreements were created regarding the patent-
ability of the discoveries resulting from this project. While NIH agrees
with other countries that an international agreement concerning the pat-
entability of partial gene sequences whose functions are yet unknown
should be discussed,1 3' it is unreasonable to expect NIH to wait until such
an agreement is reached or require NIH to publish its findings and risk
losing any patent rights. NIH was wise in seeking patent protection, not
only to "hold [their] place" until the issues are resolved, but also to stimu-
late action to address the problems resulting from this international
venture.132
127. Letter from Sergio D. J. Pena, Chairman of the Organizing Committee of the First
South-North International Human Genome Conference, to Bernadine Healy, Director,
NIH (June 19, 1992) (on file with NIH) (proposed declaration attached). The Conference
was an international gathering of scientists and others involved in the Human Genome
Initiative. A declaration requesting that consideration be given to avoiding the patenting
of naturally occurring DNA sequences was unanimously approved at the meeting. Id.
128. Butler, supra note 125, at 14.
129. Id. The French hope that the declaration, as well as Auffray's noble gesture of
turning over all research results to Unesco for free diffusion, will serve as the building
blocks for an international agreement. Id.
130. Telephone Interview, supra note 103. The U.S. supports patenting the sequences.
The U.K. condemns the U.S. for their position, but has decided to seek similar patents to
remain competitive. France has decided not to seek or support patent protection and will
make the data freely available. Swinbanks, supra note 116, at 181.
131. Daniel Q. Haney, NIH Might Accept Ban on Patenting Gene Fragments, BosT.
GLOBE, Aug. 27, 1992, at 5 (reporting that the U.S. is willing to explore other avenues of
compromise).
132. Id. (discussing American concerns and the reasons behind NIH's patent initiative).
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B. Industry's Concerns
The biotech industry has also voiced reservations regarding NIH's pat-
ent application for Dr. Venter's gene fragments. 133 Some disagree with
NIH's argument that it has the industry's best interests in mind, and be-
lieve that patents will serve as a disincentive for biotechnology invest-
ment.134 One concern is that when gene fragments are patented, private
companies will rush to the PTO to patent their partial genes and then
charge inordinate licensing fees. 13 5 Under this scenario it is possible that
a single company with only economic profits in mind could hold a mo-
nopoly on large sections of the human genome and thereby hamper scien-
tific advancement. 136  Another industry concern is that biotech
companies, especially small ones with limited capital, will invest substan-
tial time and money to find a gene with valuable utility, only to find out
that their work was futile because someone else already had patented a
sequence of the gene. 37 The biotech industry, which in the past has re-
garded the determination of a gene's function as the prize in the Cracker
Jack box, is not receptive to the idea of requiring a firm that has discov-
ered the gene's function to pay royalties to the lab that has isolated the
gene.138 The biotech industry also is concerned about skyrocketing costs
for product development and the increase in infringement litigation that
naturally accompanies an increased number of patents circulating in the
industry. 139 Finally, the Industrial Biotechnology Association, whose
members constitute eighty percent of U.S. investment in biotechnology,
submitted a position paper to NIH arguing that it is unfair for the govern-
ment to seek patents on the gene fragments absent a determination of
function, and that such a policy will reduce investment in
biotechnology. 40
NIH must be responsive to the concerns of industry because it relies on
industry to carry NIH discoveries, patented or unpatented, from its labs
133. Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 906-07.
134. U.S. 's DNA Patent Moves Upset Industry, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 1991, at B5 [herein-
after Industry Upset]. Biotechnology companies, most ' of which are small in size and
funded by venture capital, fear an "expensive technology free-for-all" if NIH is awarded
the patents. Id.
135. Stout, supra note 15, at B1.
136. Id. at B3.
137. See Industry Upset, supra note 134, at B5.
138. Stephen Green, The Race for Gene Patents, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1991, at D1.
139. Eisenberg, supra note 80, at 907.
140. Id.
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into the commercial sector.141 NIH maintains that by allowing the gene
fragments to enter the public domain without any intellectual property
rights, industry will lose incentives to develop products because there is
always the fear that a competitor will have the same sequence and win
the race.142 Protecting the rights to gene sequences will also stimulate
industry to exploit any commercial aspects of the gene, thus delivering
additional benefits to the public.143 Although some in the biotech indus-
try disagree with these predictions, 144 the majority see the merits of pat-
ent protection, as evidenced from the fact that American Biotechnology
Association, which represents a strong percentage of the U.S. biotechnol-
ogy industry, gave their support for the NIH patent initiative. 4 In addi-
tion, filing the application is wise because it tests the waters to see if
cDNA is patentable, and also protects NIH's property interests should
another company or institute file a similar patent claim.
146
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States' system of patent law, as created by Thomas Jeffer-
son, has stood the test of time as a result of the efforts of all of the
branches of the federal government to adapt when new technology dic-
tated change. Presently, our world is enveloped in a biotech revolution
which has provided novel challenges in the field of patent law. NIH has
properly set the stage for the future of biotechnology by filing an applica-
tion to patent the gene sequences. Now, it is up to the PTO, the courts,
Congress and the Executive branch to guide biotechnology on the course
it will follow into the 21st century. The protection of scientific discoveries
is necessary to encourage scientists and companies to expend the time
and money needed to carry the cures for disease from the minds of re-
searchers to the hands of patients.
Paul J. Riley
141. Memorandum, supra note 104, at 3.
142. Christopher Anderson, NIH Defends Gene Patents As Filing Deadline Approaches,
357 NATURE 270 (1992).
143. Benson, supra note 37, at 8.
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145. Memorandum, supra note 104, at 3.
146. Biotechnology Development and Patent Law, supra note 6, at 1.
* In February 1994, after this paper was sent to press, NIH, under new Director, Dr.
Harold Varmus, decided to drop its application to the cDNA sequences. The controversy
over the patentability of these sequences, however, is far from over. There are still foreign
countries, and most likely private companies, who will continue to seek patent protection
over this genetic information.
